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I. INTRODUCTION 
International law, and international lawyers generally, tend to take 
a somewhat conservative approach to the formation of rules. When 
confronted with the growing availability of leaked information, 
naturally we might be cautious in considering how the leaks are 
affecting international law. This paper will assess the growing 
influence of leaked information on the rules of international law. One 
of the more pressing issues concerning the increasing prominence of 
leaked information is criminal responsibility for the leak, in terms of 
the possible criminal prosecution of WikiLeaks’ founder, 
WikiLeaks’ classification as a terrorist organization, and the possible 
criminal prosecution of people leaking the information in the first 
place.1 The second pressing issue is the legal responsibility under 
domestic or international law (or in the court of public opinion) for 
the acts that are documented in the leaks, such as possible criminal 
prosecution of organizations or individuals implicated in bribery or 
corruption by government officials, or possible state responsibility 
for actions depicted in reports on questionable use of military force 
and extrajudicial killings or war crimes.2 However, an additional 
 
 1. See In re Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, Charge Sheet (Form DD-458) (July 5, 
2010), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2010/ 
Manning-charge-sheet.pdf (alleging violations of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, arts. 92, 134; 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e), 1030(a)(1)–(2) (2006); Army Reg. 25-
2, ¶¶ 4-5(a)(3), 4-6(k)). See generally Gilead Light, The Wikileaks Story and 
Criminal Liability Under Espionage Laws, 28 WESTLAW J. COMP. & INTERNET 1 
(Sept. 29, 2010) (contending that Julian Assange may be immune to persecution 
under current U.S. espionage laws). 
 2. See, e.g., Charlie Savage et al., Classified Files Offer New Insights into 
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/ 
guantanamo-files-lives-in-an-american-limbo.html (discussing the coercive 
questioning of Mohammed Qahtani as “[t]he best-documented case of an abusive 
interrogation at Guantánamo”); see also Doug Meier, Changing with the Times: 
How Government Must Adapt to Prevent the Publication of Its Secrets, 28 REV. 
LITIG. 203 (2008); Katherine Tsai, How to Create International Law: The Case of 
Internet Freedom in China, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 401 (2011) (“Google’s 
accusations were confirmed when diplomatic cables leaked to WikiLeaks revealed 
that the Chinese Politburo directed ‘computer sabotage . . . [of Google], American 
government computers, . . . Western allies, . . . and American businesses.’”) (citing 
Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. 
Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/ 
world/29cables.html). A related issue is the governmental mission of secrecy and 
related matters of frank, potentially embarrassing evaluations of situations. See, 
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issue, which this author has not seen yet, is a discussion of how the 
leaked information itself might tell us more about the rules of 
international law or even change the rules themselves. This paper 
argues that international lawyers must begin to consider the role of 
leaked information in the formation and content of the rules of 
international law. 
This paper is not especially focused on WikiLeaks, though it is 
representative of the phenomenon and the source used primarily for 
this paper, but it is not unique.3 WikiLeaks is the best known 
example of a new phenomenon, but if it were to disappear tomorrow, 
it would be replaced. The very decentralized nature of the Internet 
would provide for it. In addition, major news sources rely on 
WikiLeaks for their services and have an interest in either supporting 
its existence or replacing it with a substitute.4 Due to the presence of 
 
e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (taking judicial notice of the 
existence of the unclassified report, Office of Inspector General, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., (Unclassified) The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria 5, 22, 
26–27 (2008), and the statement in the report that “private” diplomatic assurances 
against torture were received, without disclosing their content); U.S. Dep’t State 
[DOS], Cable No. 09-ROME-649, ¶ 2 (June 9, 2009) (discussing Berlusconi as 
“feckless, vain, and ineffective as a modern European leader”); DOS Cable No. 
09-PRETORIA-2245, ¶ 9 (Nov. 3, 2009) (quoting the minister referring to Mugabe 
as “the crazy old man”); DOS Cable No. 09-TRIPOLI-771 (Sept. 29, 2009) 
(discussing Qaddafi’s eccentricities); DOS Cable No. 09-JEDDAH-443 (Nov. 18, 
2009) (describing the double standards of Saudi culture, where the elite youth 
enjoy “[t]he full range of worldly temptations and vices . . . behind closed doors”); 
DOS Cable No. 06- MINSK-311, ¶ 1 (Mar. 22, 2006) (painting an unflattering 
picture of a “clearly disturbed” Lukashenko at a press conference where he gave 
“bizarre answers”); Afua Hirsch, WikiLeaks Cables Lay Bare US Hostility to 
International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/dec/17/wikileaks-us-international-criminal-
court (discussing Luis Moreno-Ocampo as having “mediocre English skills”). This 
problem is not a legal problem per se, but it does shed light on possible reasons for 
the criminalization of leaking information in the first place. 
 3. This paper will also contemplate accidental leaks of sensitive, confidential 
information, though it is less central to this discussion. See, e.g., David Millward & 
Thomas Harding, Secrets Put on Internet in Whitehall Blunders, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 
17, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8457506/Secrets-put-
on-internet-in-Whitehall-blunders.html. 
 4. See Mark Davis, Inside Wikileaks, DATELINE SBS (AUSTRALIA), Aug. 1, 
2010, available at http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/about/id/600647/n/Inside-
WikiLeaks (reporting interview with Julian Assange detailing his extensive 
existing working relationship with major newspapers such as The New York Times, 
Guardian, and Der Spiegel, including the fact that those newspapers provide 
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WikiLeaks and similar players, the availability of leaked information 
is growing. Much of the information is trivial, but some of it has 
proved to be important. For example, WikiLeaks’ founder Julian 
Assange has somewhat tenuously claimed that WikiLeaks played a 
triggering role in the Arab Spring.5 Because of the magnitude of 
leaked information, it is now becoming significant in international 
affairs. 
This paper will walk through the various sources of law, roughly 
following the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), 
although some additions may be relevant, and examine each source 
to see whether and how leaked information might contribute to the 
formation of law. This paper will not address the validity and 
accuracy of the ICJ sources, or the other sources mentioned herein, 
saving that discussion for another day. 
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The sources of international law are well known and most 
frequently summarized by reference to the Statute of the ICJ.6 These 
sources include treaties, customary international law, and general 
principles of law, assisted by judicial decisions and the writings of 
eminent jurists as subsidiary sources. They are supplemented by 
unilateral statements as per the Nuclear Tests cases7 and obligations 
incurred under treaties due to certain acts of international 
organizations, such as binding Chapter VII Resolutions of the U.N. 
Security Council. This paper will proceed through the various 
sources to examine how they may be affected by leaked information. 
 
sensitive information to WikiLeaks for it to leak). 
 5. See Isabel Coles, Assange: WikiLeaks’ Cables Spurred Arab Uprisings, 
REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/ 
us-britain-assange-idUSTRE72E9LO20110316. 
 6. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter Statute of the I.C.J.] (“(a) [I]nternational 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of general practice 
accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.”). 
 7. See Nuclear Tests (Aust’l v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20). 
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A. EX TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR ACTIO 
As a threshold matter, before we turn to an examination of how 
leaked information might contribute to, or affect the interpretation of, 
international law, we must consider whether information received 
through a possibly illegal leak can be relied on in establishing rules. 
The Latin expression ex turpi causa non oritur actio (“ex turpi”) is 
usually translated as “a right cannot stem from a wrong.”8 This 
principle is similar to that of ex injuria jus non oritur (“ex injuria”) 
where international law provides that a legal right or entitlement 
cannot arise out of an unlawful act or omission.9 Similar principles 
are commodom ex injuris sua nemo habere debet (wrongdoer cannot 
take advantage of his actions) and crimen omnia ex se nata vitiat 
(property obtained by crime is vitiated). In all of these principles, an 
actor is forbidden to benefit by the creation of a legal right from his 
wrongful action. 
In the case of leaked information, the information might be 
obtained wrongfully; however, ex turpi is not applicable to the 
situation of a leak, nor are its cousins. The principal reason is that a 
right, advantage, or property must be acquired by the wrongdoer in 
order to invoke these principles.10 If the information was leaked by a 
government employee or any other person, then that information 
could still be used by a third party, such as a state, for proving the 
law.11  
 
 8. See Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 70 (June 28); Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 
P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 81, ¶ 240 (June 28); see also Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 270 (June 
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment] (Schwebel, J., dissenting); U.S. Diplomatic 
& Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 53–55, 62–63 (May 24) 
(Morozov & Tarazi, JJ., dissenting); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. 
Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Apr. 5) (Anzilotti, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]n unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at law . . . .”). 
 9. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 ¶¶ 132–37 
(July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo Case] (Cançado Trindade, J., separate opinion); 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 420–21 (1948); 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 54, 78 (Sept. 25). 
 10. See Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 5 (Mar. 26). 
 11. See Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.) (Claim for Indemnity) 
(Jurisdiction), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (July 26) (“[O]ne Party cannot 
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In addition, the wrongdoing in ex injuria is usually considered to 
be at the level of serious violations of the law, e.g., grave breaches or 
violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law, or the 
prohibition on the use of force.12 Judge Cançado Trindade, in his 
separate opinion in the Kosovo Declaration of Independence 
Advisory Opinion, went so far as to suggest that ex injuria can even 
be counterbalanced by ex factis jus oritur (“ex factis”) when the 
violations are not of a serious gravity.13 Furthermore, those acts are 
usually considered to contemplate only serious unlawful acts of the 
state, not acts by private actors.14 
In any event, all of the foregoing presumes that a leak of 
 
avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligation . . . if the 
former Party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the 
obligation in question . . . .”); Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, 1925 P.C.I.J. 
at 50 (“M. Mavrommatis was bound to perform the acts which he actually did 
perform in order to preserve his contracts from lapsing as they would otherwise 
have done.”). 
 12. See Kosovo Case, supra note 9; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 420–21. 
 13. See Kosovo Case, supra note 9,  ¶¶ 136–37 (Cançado Trindade, J., separate 
opinion). 
136. This general principle, well-established as it is, has at times been 
counterbalanced by the maxim ex factis jus oritur . . . It is inconceivable that States' 
rights can arise, or be preserved, by means of a consistent pattern of grave violations 
of human rights and of international humanitarian law. 
137. Thus, the maxim ex factis jus oritur does not amount to a carte blanche, as 
Law plays its role also in the emergence of rights out of the tension between Sollen 
and Sein. In the present stage of evolution of the law of nations (le droit des gens), it is 
unsustainable that a people should be forced to live under oppression, or that control of 
territory could be used as a means for conducting State-planned and perpetrated 
oppression. That would amount to a gross and flagrant reversal of the ends of the 
State, as a promoter of the common good. 
(citing LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 287–88). 
 14. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law 
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, in 92-II REC. DES COURS 
HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 119 (1957) (“Thus a State which is guilty of illegal conduct 
may be deprived of the necessary locus standi in judicio for complaining of 
corresponding illegalities on the part of other States, especially if these were 
consequential on or were embarked upon in order to counter its own illegality—in 
short were provoked by it.”). That is not to say that the leaked information could 
never involve an unlawful act by a state. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations art. 22, ¶ 1, art. 27, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (stating 
that certain forms of eavesdropping on diplomatic missions by receiving States 
would be violations of the principle of inviolability of the premises and/or freedom 
of communication). 
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information is unlawful under international law. If the leaking is 
unlawful under one state’s laws, leaking confidential information of 
that state may still not be unlawful under the laws of other states. In 
fact, states receiving leaked information might positively condone, 
endorse, or even encourage such leaks. Since states tend to protect 
only their own information, it seems difficult to find a rule of 
customary international law generally prohibiting individuals from 
leaking information. Domestic law prohibiting leaks is irrelevant 
without a rule of international law, since a state cannot cite internal 
laws in defense against international obligations.15 In this sense, a 
state could not invoke its domestic prohibition on leaking 
information as a defense against the formation or evidence of a rule 
of international law. 
Lastly, the principles cited above apply in situations where the 
actor relies on the unlawful act for the direct creation of the right or 
benefit. Here the state relying on the leaked information for proof of 
a legal norm is not relying on the act of leaking for a right or benefit, 
but rather the content of the leak. Thus, the state is not relying on the 
unlawful act itself for any claim or right. We must distinguish a legal 
claim from a legal rule. The claim relies on the rule, which is 
evidenced (not created) by the document, which was leaked. Thus, 
there is no reliance on the act of leaking for a legal right or benefit. 
B. THE LAW OF TREATIES 
Under the law of treaties, there are two topics that leaked 
information can help address: (1) whether a certain communication 
constitutes a treaty and (2) interpreting the treaty’s content. 
1. Definition of a Treaty 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter 
 
 15. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; Avena & Other Mexican Nationals 
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 3 (Mar. 31); LaGrand Case (Germ. v. U.S.), 
Provisional Measures Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16, ¶ 28 (Mar. 3); Elettronica Sicula 
S.p.A. (ELSI), 1989 I.C.J. 51, ¶ 73 (July 20); Treatment of Polish Nationals & 
Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, 4, 24–25; Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, [2001] II-2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, art. 3 U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
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“VCLT” or “Vienna Convention”) Article 2(1) provides that: 
For the purposes of the present articles: (a) “Treaty” means an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation. 
First, it is important to note that this provision in the VCLT does 
not necessarily purport to define treaties, but merely states how the 
term “treaty” is used in the VCLT.16 However, the provision in the 
VCLT has been held to define treaties generally. Thus, we can 
conclude that there are three elements to the definition of a treaty: (1) 
that the agreement is concluded between states, (2) that the 
agreement is made in writing, and (3) that it is governed by 
international law. In addition, there are two clarifications: (a) that its 
form in two or more related instruments is irrelevant and (b) that its 
particular designation is irrelevant. 
a. Secret Treaties 
In the specific case of leaked information, the leak could be a leak 
of a secret treaty, or at least the text of the secret treaty terms. The 
VCLT merely provides that the instrument must be in writing; it does 
not require publication or notice. Clearly, the documents leaked by 
WikiLeaks and similar organizations are written documents, so the 
issue here is whether the written instrument’s secrecy prevents it 
from being a treaty according to the Vienna Convention’s terms.  
Whether an instrument is recorded or registered has been 
suggested as evidence that the instrument was meant to be a treaty.17 
It is true that states party to the U.N. Charter have an obligation to 
register their treaties with the organization. However, the 
consequences of failure to register are not that the treaty is non-
binding, but rather that the treaty cannot be invoked in the UN.18 
Beyond this obligation, there does not appear to be any obligation for 
 
 16. See Comm. of the Whole, 1st Sess., 6th plen. mtg. at 34 ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.39/11 (Apr. 1, 1968) [hereinafter VCLT Conference Recs.]. 
 17. See U.N. Charter art. 102 (providing that instruments are not binding until 
registered); cf. League of Nations Covenant art. 18 (same). 
 18. See R.B. Lillich, The Obligation to Register Treaties and International 
Agreements with the United Nations, 65 AM. J. INT. L. 771, 772 (1971). 
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states to otherwise publicize their treaties.19 While there may be 
domestic rules on publication, those rules are not applicable on the 
international plane.20 Therefore, as long as the instrument is in 
writing and otherwise satisfies the elements, the instrument will be a 
treaty even if it is secret.  
b. Non-Legally Binding Agreements 
The second way in which leaked information might lend evidence 
to whether there is a treaty or not is regarding the binding nature of 
the agreement. The third element of a treaty, “governed by 
international law,” is still controversial as to whether it requires state 
intent to be legally binding. The two major voices on either side of 
this debate are Anthony Aust21 and Jan Klabbers.22 Aust argues that 
agreements are only treaties where the parties so intend with other 
documents being non-binding, “political” agreements, which he 
terms “Memoranda of Understanding.”23 Klabbers argues that all 
 
 19. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 539, 541–42 (1947). The lack of an obligation could affect how we 
seek to understand and state the law. Schwarzenberger explains the historical 
reliance on naturalist, deductive methods for determining the law as partly due to 
the secrecy historically surrounding international power relations. As that intense 
degree of secrecy has diminished, the deductive method has faded. “Furthermore, 
then — as today — interstate relations were primarily power relations and 
demanded a certain degree of secrecy. It required twentieth-century subtlety to find 
out that secrecy can be as effectively obtained by the publication of floods of 
material as by burying it in the Tower of London or corresponding places 
elsewhere. This was the way of the more unsophisticated power politicians up to 
the end of the seventeenth century.” Id. Following Schwarzenberger, perhaps the 
increased availability of originally secret documents will cause a further drift in 
international law more completely toward the positivist, inductive approach and 
away from naturalist, deductive methods. In any event, Schwarzenberger saw 
secrecy as a normal aspect of international relations that simply had consequences 
on the techniques for finding the law. 
 20. See, e.g., Becker v. Préfet de la Moselle Case No. 109 (Trib. De 
Sarreguemines, Fr., June 22, 1948), reprinted at 38 REV. CRIT. DE DROIT INT’L 
PRIVE 55 (1949) (holding that an exchange of letters between France and Germany 
regarding the nationality of persons in Alsace Lorraine established the intention of 
the parties, but that they had not been ratified by Parliament, and thus could not 
modify interpretations of the Treaty of Versailles). 
 21. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed., 2007). 
 22. JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996). 
 23. See AUST, supra note 21, at 49–51. But see KLABBERS, supra note 22, at 
53–55 (conceding that even non-binding instruments may have legal 
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agreements that satisfy the Vienna Convention are legally binding 
and that there is no room for “political” agreements between or 
among states.24 For him, intent is not determinative. Most 
commentators, and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), 
appear to agree with Aust,25 but interestingly the ICJ (and Permanent 
Court of International Justice) appear to agree with Klabbers.26 In 
addition, it would appear that states sometimes disagree over whether 
 
consequences). 
 24. See generally KLABBERS, supra note 22. However, Klabbers does not 
attempt to address instruments that are expressly designed not to create legal rights 
and obligations. 
 25. See, e.g., Sultanov v. Russ., App. No. 15303/09 ¶ 58, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) 
(request for referral to the Grand Chamber pending); Yuldashev v. Russ., App. No. 
1248/09 ¶ 70, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Special Rapporteur, Rep. on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/60/316 ¶ 51 (Aug. 30, 2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL 
AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE (2005), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/node/11783/section/1. It might be argued that in 
the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. agreed with Aust. See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 161 (June 
27). However, this author understands the court found that the parties (Nicaragua 
and the Organization of American States) did not reach an agreement, not that they 
refused to subject their agreement to international law. 
 26. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶ 27 (July 1) (“The Court does not find it 
necessary to consider what might have been the intentions of the Foreign Minister 
of Bahrain or, for that matter, those of the Foreign Minister of Qatar. The two 
Ministers signed a text recording commitments accepted by their Governments, 
some of which were to be given immediate application. Having signed such a text, 
the Foreign Minister of Bahrain is not in a position subsequently to say that he 
intended to subscribe only to a ‘statement recording a political understanding’, and 
not to an international agreement.”); see also Land & Maritime Boundary Between 
Cameroon & Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 
303 (Oct. 10) (citing VCLT, supra note 15, art. 46(1), to hold that the applicable 
agreement constituted a treaty even though the Nigerian Supreme Military Council 
never ratified it); Land, Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.; Nicar. 
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11) (finding the boundary agreement binding 
even though El Salvador had only signed ad referendum); Border and Transborder 
Armed Acts. (Nic. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. Reps. 69 (Dec. 20) (regarding the Cancun 
Declaration as legally binding); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, at 70, ¶¶ 93–95 (Feb. 24) (focusing on the dissenting 
opinions of judges Ago and Jimenez, which state that the modus vivendi was a 
treaty); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Juris., 1978 I.C.J. Reps. 3 
(stating that no rule prohibiting a joint communiqué from being a legally binding 
instrument exists). 
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an agreement is legally binding,27 demonstrating that even in this 
area there does not appear to be a universal understanding of which 
agreements are governed by international law. This author has 
concluded elsewhere that neither of these positions is satisfactory 
and that we must seek a more nuanced approach to determining 
whether the instrument was intended to be legally binding.28 
Leaked information can be very helpful in determining intent to be 
bound. Whereas certain instruments might on their face appear clear, 
the formerly secret diplomatic correspondence and negotiating drafts 
can provide contradictory evidence of the legal value that the parties 
intend for the instrument to have. Sometimes the intent of states is 
clear;29 other times the states appear simply confused,30 perhaps even 
 
 27. See, e.g., Heathrow Airport User Charges, Award on the First Question 
(U.S. v. U.K.), 34 R.I.A.A. 3 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1992) (noting the United States claim 
that an MOU was binding in arbitration). 
 28. See William Thomas Worster, Between Treaty and Not: A Case Study of 
the Legal Value of Diplomatic Assurances in Expulsion Cases, 21(2) MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 253 (2012). In this article, the author argues that we start with the 
understanding that international law applies to all state relations and that states 
cannot exempt themselves from it, even by agreement. As a corollary, we also start 
with the presumption that all agreements are governed by international law. We 
also accept, however, that states may invoke an implied right to enter into non-
binding agreements, though these are construed narrowly. Authors should be 
explicit in providing for this exception, but such an effect could be implied in rare 
circumstances. Even where a non-binding effect can be implied, provisions within 
the agreement might be severable, with certain provisions attracting binding force 
and others not. 
 29. See DOS Cable No. 10-PARIS-183 (Feb. 17, 2010) (“French Environment 
Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the Ambassador that the key to advancing climate 
negotiations is to drop the notion of a legally binding TREATY in favor of a 
system of national commitments. He also argued that it would be up to a small 
group of eight or ten heads of state, and their sherpas, to negotiate implementation 
of the Copenhagen Accord. Borloo attributed the European obsession with legally 
binding treaties to its post-war history and experience in creating the EU by 
progressively ceding sovereignty via TREATY. The key to reaching this kind of 
deal would be credible action on tradable quotas, forests, and finance including 
innovative financing mechanisms. The Copenhagen Accord was not a failure, but 
allowing the means to become the ends was a trap.”); DOS Cable No. 10-
RIYADH-184, ¶ 11 (Feb. 12, 2010) (“The failed Copenhagen climate change 
summit produced only a non-binding Accord, but the agreement suits US interests 
as it presents more chance of forcing China to act . . . . Prince Abdulaziz told the 
Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed a real opportunity to submit ‘something 
clever,’ like India or China, that was not legally binding but indicated some 
goodwill towards the process without compromising key economic interests.”). 
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 30. See, e.g., DOS Cable No. 10-THE HAGUE-7, ¶ 3 (Jan. 8, 2010) 
(containing the draft terms of the US-Dutch Agreement of Cooperation Concerning 
Access to and Use of Facilities in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba for Aerial 
Counter-Narcotics Activities (“FOL”), stating in the same document that the 
agreement was not legally binding, but then arguing that the agreement 
“authorized” a certain act and demanded “compliance.” “This bilateral agreement 
allows the USG access to and use of the Hato International Airport in the 
Netherlands Antilles and the Reina Beatrix International Airport in Aruba . . . 
solely in connection with aerial counter-narcotics detection and monitoring . . .”); 
id. ¶ 2. (“The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands] has requested 
a letter signed by the Ambassador confirming that the U.S. abides by the 
provisions of the March 2, 2000 [Agreement] . . . .”); id. ¶ 5 (“Nonetheless, the 
MFA has requested a letter from the U.S. Ambassador stating the airfields are only 
being used as authorized in the FOL Agreement.”); id. ¶ 6. (“Still, it is to our 
benefit to assist the Dutch Government to state explicitly that confirmation of 
compliance with the FOL Agreement has been received from the U.S.”); see also 
DOS Cable No. 08-MADRID-1280, ¶ 8 (Dec. 4, 2008) (discussing the Agreement 
on Defence Cooperation (“ADC”) between the United States and Spain: “The 
ADC provides us the extremely valuable use of two military bases in southern 
Spain midway between the continental U.S. and the theaters of operation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. . . . By unfortunate coincidence, the ADC was already in the 
press in recent weeks thanks to MOD Chacon’s repeated references to her hope 
that the U.S. would elevate it to the level of a TREATY (septel).”). But see id. ¶ 3 
(“El Pais published a February 2007 letter from the Spanish President of the joint 
Permanent Committee which manages implementation of the ADC, asking the 
U.S. section to confirm that the U.S. was in compliance with Article 25.2 of the 
ADC with respect to U.S. military flights to and from Guantanamo . . . .”); id. ¶ 9 
(“When we do speak publicly on the issue, our mantra is that we have not violated 
Spanish law and have complied fully with the ADC.”); id. ¶ 10 (“Thus far, the 
MOD and MFA have done a reasonably good job in their public affairs efforts of 
making clear that they do not believe we have violated the ADC. The MOD issued 
a December 2 statement saying it knew of no U.S. military flights that were either 
illegal or in violation of our bilateral agreements (this echoes what MOD officials 
have told us privately — e.g. ref b).”); DOS Cable No. 08-TRIPOLI-308, ¶ 3 (Apr. 
10, 2008). The proposed MOU text is as follows: 
Section Six: Dispute Resolution. Any disputes that might arise between the two parties 
regarding the interpretation or the implementation of this MOU shall be resolved 
through negotiations between the two parties solely. 
 . . . 
Section Nine: Entry into Force, its Scope and Termination 
1- This MOU shall enter into force upon its signature by both parties. 
2- This MOU does not include any provisions that entail commitments under 
International Law 
3- This MOU shall remain effective unless terminated by a mutual agreement, or by 
either party, upon 90-day written notice submitted in advance to the other party. 
See DOS Cable No. 10-PARIS-183, supra note 29; DOS Cable No. 10-RIYADH-
184, supra note 29, ¶ 11; DOS Cable No. 10-MADRID-174, ¶¶ 8–11 (Feb. 12, 
2010) (discussing the 1998 Washington Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art and 
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sloppy,31 which is informative in itself as to the legal value of the 
instrument. 
2. Interpretation of Treaty Terms 
The other way in which leaked information might influence the 
rules of international law is where the information bears on the 
interpretation of treaty provisions.  
a. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
Earlier we examined the rule of ex turpi, but another rule is 
important here: “the fruit of the poisonous tree.”32 This rule prohibits 
the introduction of evidence against a party where it was gained 
unlawfully. Thus the evidence—at least in U.S. practice—is subject 
to an exclusionary rule. We can distinguish this rule from that of ex 
 
the 2009 Prague Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art, and the U.S. signature on 
the “Declarations of Principles” in the context of the Cassirer claim to a Pissarro 
painting; acknowledging the signature on the Declaration of Principles but stating 
that Spain could rely on its internal law to bar the claim—not possible if the 
agreement was concluded under international law—and seek alternate “creative 
solutions” amounting to “gestures to the family and to the Los Angeles Jewish 
community”); DOS Cable No. 09-KYIV-1942, ¶¶ 6, 54 (Nov. 9, 2009) (discussing 
“security assurances”: “The first item Nykonenko raised during the one-on-
meeting was an appeal for additional security assurances for Ukraine, beyond those 
the U.S. had provided in the 1994 Budapest Declaration . . . Legally binding 
assurances were best, he concluded, but he said he understood this was very 
difficult. Couch asked Nykonenko to explain why Ukraine needed additional, 
legally binding security assurances, . . . Nykonenko responded that Ukraine had no 
doubts about the commitment of the United States; however, Ukraine had serious 
concerns about Russia’s commitment . . . Nykonenko explained that if the United 
States would agree to new security assurances with Ukraine, then Russia would 
likely agree to join in the document . . . .”). 
 31. See DOS Cable No. 10-PORT LOUIS-46, ¶ 2 (Feb. 17, 2010) (comingling 
discussions about considerations for an exchange of letters and an MOU, which, 
although the MOU and the exchange of letters are expressly identified as such, 
could suggest a less rigorous division between the two in practice). “Also, 
Seychelles now has both an MOU with the UK and an exchange-of-letters with the 
European Union regarding pirate transfer/prosecution. Given these developments, 
Embassy believes it is now time to pursue a U.S./Seychelles MOU on pirate 
transfer/prosecution”). Id.; DOS Cable No. 10-PORT LOUIS-48 (Feb. 17, 2010) 
(continuing discussion on the same topic). 
 32. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) 
(providing that “evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute 
proof against the victim of the search”). 
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turpi. In ex turpi, the wrong itself creates the claim of a right, 
whereas under the fruit of the poisonous tree the wrong produces 
evidence pertaining to a right. For the reasons discussed below, the 
fruit of the poisonous tree rule is not applicable to proof of the law 
here.  
Firstly, it is unclear if the fruit of the poisonous tree, especially in 
its strong form as an exclusionary rule, exists as a rule under 
international law.33 This author is not aware of any international 
treaties that mandate an exclusionary rule in state-to-state dispute 
settlement for evidence gathered in the course of violating the law 
generally. International human rights conventions have provided that 
states must respect individuals’ human rights and provide a right to 
an effective remedy—right to an impartial tribunal and right to a fair 
hearing—for violations, though not necessarily a remedy of 
exclusion of evidence.34 The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”), and its accompanying Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, provide that the court may exclude evidence from trial 
where the risk of prejudice outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence sufficient to undermine the right to a fair trial.35 In 
particular, evidence may be excluded where there was a violation of 
 
 33. Most commentators identify the role of the jury in common law 
proceedings as the crucial determining factor for rules of evidence, and especially 
exclusion. See, e.g., International Conference on Military Trials: London, 1945—
Minutes of Conference Session of June 26, 1945, YALE LAW SCHOOL, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack13.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2012)  (citing 
Robert Jackson: “The idea may have more significance to British and American 
lawyers than it does to Continental lawyers. . . . We do not want technical rules of 
evidence designed for jury trials to be used in this case to cut down what is really 
and fairly of probative value . . .”). However, the form and manner in which the 
rule is applied in common law practice does not mean that similarly obtained 
evidence is always admissible in the courts of civil law states. See, e.g., Gäfgen v. 
Germ., App. No. 22978/05 ¶ 147, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 759 (2010) (holding that 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights—regarding the right to a 
fair trial—does not impose particular rules of exclusion of evidence, but instead 
requires that the trial overall is fair, so only a direct causal link between the 
unlawful treatment by the state and the conviction was problematic). 
 34. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights arts. 2(1)–2(2), 14(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty 
Doc. 95-20. 
 35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(4), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
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the Rome Statute or international human rights law, and that 
violation raises “substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence 
or . . . the admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and 
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.”36 The laws 
of the local jurisdiction where the evidence was gathered is not 
determinative on the assessment by the ICC.37 Generally, the state is 
free to address the remedy for wrongfully gained evidence within the 
context of its particular legal system, where the solution might be 
exclusion or not.38 
However, some treaties do provide specifically for the exclusion 
of evidence gained by committing acts that the treaty prohibits, 
uniquely torture.39 The Eighth Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders agreed on non-binding guidelines for 
prosecutors recommending that evidence be excluded where it has 
been obtained through the use or threat of torture or similar 
coercion.40 Even if exclusion of evidence in this case could be 
considered a binding rule under international law, it appears to be 
limited only to torture.  
Turning to customary international law, there also does not appear 
 
 36. Id. art. 69(7). 
 37. Id. art. 69(8). 
 38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 34, art. 
2(3) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) to ensure that any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such 
a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of 
judicial remedy; (c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted.”). 
 39. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 40. See Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 8th U.N. Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime & the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 27, 1990–Sept. 7, 1990, 
art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, 189 (1990) (“When prosecutors come 
into possession of evidence against suspects that they know or believe on 
reasonable grounds was obtained through recourse to unlawful methods, which 
constitute a grave violation of the suspect’s human rights, especially involving 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or other abuses of 
human rights, they shall refuse to use such evidence against anyone other than 
those who used such methods . . . .”). 
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to be an exclusionary rule for evidence gained unlawfully. We can 
begin our assessment of customary international law by examining 
the jurisdiction(s) where the rule is most vigorously applied: the 
United States, and to a lesser degree other common law 
jurisdictions.41 Looking first at U.S. law, it is interesting to note that 
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Wolf in the course of 
analyzing whether the fruit of the poisonous tree must be excluded 
from evidence as being “implicit in ordered liberty,” referred to the 
practice of other states and argued that: 
[T]he immediate question is whether the basic right to protection against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically 
relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure 
because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be 
excluded. As a matter of inherent reason, one would suppose this to be an 
issue to which men with complete devotion to the protection of the right 
of privacy might give different answers. When we find that in fact most of 
the English-speaking world does not regard as vital to such protection the 
exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy 
as an essential ingredient of the right.42  
Frankfurter cited the practice of the UK and other common law 
jurisdictions to conclude that exclusion was not the usual practice 
internationally43 and was also not a part of the common law. 
Additionally, this acknowledgement means that when Wolf was 
overturned in Mapp, and the exclusionary rule was upheld,44 the 
United States became the only common law jurisdiction that had 
 
 41. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990); Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533, 536–37 (1988); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25 (1949); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 42. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25. 
 43. See id. at App. (citing Miller v. Noblet [1927] SASR 385 (Austl.); R. v. 
Nelson, [1922] 2 W.W.R. 381, 69 D.L.R. 180 (Can.); Durousel, 41 Man. 15, 
[1933] 2 D.L.R. 446 (Man.); R. v. Doyle, 12 Ont. 347 (Ont.); R. v. Kostachuk, 24 
Sask. 485, 54 Can. C.C. 189 (Sask.); Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 K.B. 164 (Eng.); 
Ali Ahmad Khan v. Emp., 81 I.C. 615(1) (Ind.); Baldeo Bin v. Emp., 142 I.C. 639 
(Calcutta); Chwa Hum Htive v. Emp., 143 I.C. 824 (Rangoon); Hodgson v. 
McPherson, [1913] S.C.(J.) 68, 73 (Scot.)). 
 44. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
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adopted a mandatory exclusionary rule for evidence obtained from 
an unlawful search and seizure.45 Until Mapp in 1961, the United 
States held that the exclusionary rule, as a rule of remedy, was 
applicable only at the discretion of state legislatures.46 
In addition, the exclusionary rule for wrongfully gathered 
evidence is not absolute. There are exceptions to the rule, such as the 
inevitable discovery rule. This rule provides that, where the evidence 
that is tainted by the violation of the law inevitably would have been 
or was discovered later, it will not be excluded simply because it 
was, or was initially, discovered through the violation.47 Some 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been reversed. Since this is 
an examination of the rule under international law rather than 
specifically under U.S. law, rules that have been reversed remain 
informative of the rule at international law. One major exception that 
was later reversed was the Silver Platter rule, in which evidence 
unlawfully obtained by state officials and barred as evidence could 
nonetheless be used by federal government officials, since they had 
not committed the prohibited acts.48 This rule was reversed in 1960.49 
The exceptions to the rule,50 even if mostly historical, suggest that 
the rule is not absolute and can be abridged. 
In sum, U.S. law generally provides for application of the 
exclusionary rule under the principle of “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
only where the case is one of criminal law.51 When applied, it 
involves protection from the state (government officials)52 against 
 
 45. See, e.g., Minister of Finance v. Braswell, 132 INT’L L. REPS. 237, 269 ¶ 78 
(Berm. Ct. App., Nov. 28, 2002) (“[T]he ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ principle 
under the Miranda rule of US law . . . is not a rule applied in the English or 
Bermuda courts.”). 
 46. Also note that, following Wolf, the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 
unlawful searches or seizures was not mandatory for the states until Mapp made it 
mandatory. 
 47. See Nix. v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984). 
 48. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (discussing the “silver 
platter” doctrine). 
 49. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 50. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
(1920) (articulating the “independent source” doctrine). 
 51. See Roe v. Harvey, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 302, 305 (Engl., K.B.) 
(distinguishing the court’s ability to compel a party to produce inculpatory 
evidence in a civil suit from a criminal case). 
 52. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 442–43 (1984) (“The core rationale consistently 
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torture, compulsion, or similar violation of fundamental 
(“constitutional”) rights.53 However, even where all of these aspects 
are met, exclusion is not always a mandatory remedy.54 
Other common law jurisdictions make provision for the exclusion 
of evidence obtained in violation of the law but do not adopt such a 
categorical perspective on exclusion. In general, the common law, as 
applied in various commonwealth countries, admitted anything into 
evidence that was relevant, probative, and reliable, and it disregarded 
the way in which the evidence came into the possession of the party 
submitting it.55 The judge, however, did have a general discretion to 
exclude evidence where the probative value was outweighed by its 
prejudicial potential, but this was largely a question of reliability of 
the evidence.56 It would appear that the American approach is 
essentially focused on the rights of the accused, whereas other 
common law jurisdictions concentrate on the fairness and legitimacy 
of the trial proceedings generally. 
In the UK, the treatment is consistent with the general common 
 
advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the 
fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially 
costly course is needed to deter police from . . . violations of constitutional and 
statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure 
such protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations 
notwithstanding the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go 
unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a 
better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.”); Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (“[The Fourth Amendment was] intended to 
protect against invasions of ‘the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ 
from searches under indiscriminate, general authority. Protection of these interests 
was assured by prohibiting all ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures, and by 
requiring the use of warrants, which particularly describe ‘the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized,’ thereby interposing ‘a magistrate between 
the citizen and the police’ . . . .”) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 53. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 442–43 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
242 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); R v. Rudd, [1775] 168 Eng. 
Rep. 160 (Engl., K.B.). 
 54. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 166 (1986); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 (1984); United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 55. See R. v. Leatham, [1861] Q.B. 495 (Eng.) (“It matters not how you get it; 
if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence.”) 
 56. See Adam Parachin, Compromising on the Compromise: The Supreme 
Court and Section 24(2) of the Charter, 10 WINDSOR REV. LEG. & SOC. ISSUES 7, 
13 (2000). 
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law approach, which is concerned with the administration of justice 
or general unfairness to the defendant57 rather than providing a 
remedy for a violation of rights.58 However, unfairness is not a 
question of rights, but a question of the probative value of the 
evidence.59 Where it is probative, judges rarely, if ever, exclude it. 
Canada’s exclusionary practice resembles that of the UK. The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that evidence 
obtained in violation of an accused’s civil rights may be excluded 
only if the admission of the evidence would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.60 Even prior to the Charter, Canada applied 
a similar rule of exclusion when the administration of justice would 
be brought into disrepute.61 In this way, the Canadian courts, like 
those of the UK, were concerned with reliability and probative value, 
not remedying violations of rights.62 After the “patriation” of the 
Canadian Constitution, the Charter provided for extensive rights 
including the rights against unreasonable search and seizure,63 
arbitrary detention,64 prevention from retaining or instructing 
 
 57. See Fox v. Ch. Constable, [1985] 3 All E.R. 392, 397 (U.K., H.L.) (“The 
duty of the court is [to decide if the accused is guilty], and not to discipline police 
for exceeding their powers.”); R v. Sang, [1980] App. Cas. 402, 436 (C.A., U.K., 
1979); K. v. R, [1968] 52 Crim. App. R. 353, 358 (U.K., P.C.); Kuruma v. R, 
[1955] P.C. 197, 237–40 (Eng.) (appeal taken from E. Afr.); Jones v. Owens, 
[1870] 34 Q.B. 759, 760 (Eng.) (“[I]t would be a dangerous obstacle to the 
administration of justice . . . to hold because evidence was obtained by illegal 
means it could not be used against a party charged with an offense.”). 
 58. See Kuruma, [1955] P.C. at 239. 
 59. See Callis v. Gunn, [1963] 48 A.C. 36, 40–41 (Eng., Q.B.) (holding that the 
court may exclude evidence obtained “by a trick, by threats, [and] by bribes”); R. 
v. Payne, [1963] 47 A.C. 122 (Eng.) (excluding evidence when defendant relied on 
officer’s assurance that the evidence would not be used). 
 60. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 24(2) (U.K) (“Where, in 
proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in 
a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this 
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all 
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.”). 
 61. See R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 698 (Can.) (Lamer, J.). 
 62. See R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, 273–77 (Can.) (“[E]xcluding evidence . 
. .  obtained by methods which the trial Judge considers to be unfair . . . would 
have nothing to do with securing a fair trial for the accused.”). 
 63. Canadian Charter, § 8. 
 64. Id. § 9. 
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counsel,65 failure to be informed of the specific offence charged,66 
and subjection to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.67 The 
Charter also provides remedies for these violations,68 which requires 
exclusion only when admission “[c]ould bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.”69 Thus, there is a two-step analysis: first, the 
court must determine whether there was a violation of a Charter 
right. Second, if there is a violation, the court must determine 
whether the violation brings the administration of justice into 
disrepute.70 This second step of the analysis looks to factors such as 
the fairness of the trial (i.e., whether the evidence is probative or not, 
and whether it would have been eventually discovered or not), the 
seriousness of the Charter violation, and the effect on the 
administration of justice. 
The difficulty with all of the above is that, first, it is apparent that 
a mandatory exclusionary rule is not the norm globally or the norm 
under common law and, second, where exclusion is considered, it is 
only in the face of a violation of the rights of a human being by the 
state in criminal proceedings. These concerns do not apply in the 
case of state-to-state litigation. Here the issue is whether a state may 
rely on evidence against another state where the evidence was 
obtained in violation of the law.  
However, when we turn to the case law of civil law jurisdictions 
and international tribunals applying customary international law, the 
rule virtually disappears, aside from the unique case of torture.71 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
(reviewing customary international law)72 and the ECHR (reviewing 
 
 65. Id. § 10(a)–(b). 
 66. Id. § 11(a). 
 67. Id. § 12. 
 68. Id. § 24(1) (“Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances.”). 
 69. Id. § 24(2). 
 70. See R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (Can.); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 151, 178 (Can.); R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (Can.). 
 71. For an excellent analysis of the rule in comparative law, see generally, 
Stephen C. Thaman, “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” in Comparative Law, 16 SW. 
J. INT’L L. 333 (2010). 
 72. In this context, it is important to note that the ICTY rules on evidence also 
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German law)73 do not exclude evidence automatically where the 
evidence may have been obtained unlawfully. In addition, in 
interstate disputes, the ICJ has indirectly ruled on exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of international law in the Corfu 
Channel case.74 The court held that the minesweeping operation, 
“Operation Retail,” was an unlawful violation of Albanian territorial 
waters;75 however, the court accepted the evidence submitted by the 
UK and relied on it for its judgment of the mines it discovered in the 
course of that unlawful operation.76 Since the court did not hesitate to 
 
make reference to protection of the right to a fair trial, not specific rules of 
exclusion. See, e.g., International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.46 (2011), Rule 89(C) (“A Chamber may admit 
any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”); Rule 89(D) (“A 
Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the need to ensure a fair trial.”); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, 
Judgement, ¶¶ 34–37 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, July 5, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (“Čelebici case”), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 
434 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 34 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, 
¶ 108 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1999). Furthermore, 
the European Convention on Human Rights protects the same. See Gäfgen v. 
Germany, App. No. 22978/05 ¶ 147, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 759 (2010). 
 73. See, e.g., id. (holding that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights—regarding the right to a fair trial—does not impose particular rules of 
exclusion of evidence, but instead requires that the trial overall be fair, so that only 
a direct causal link between the unlawful treatment by the state and the conviction 
is problematic); Jalloh v. Germany, App. No. 54810/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) 
(finding a trial to be unfair where evidence was obtained by the state in the course 
of violating Article 3 of the ECHR—torture, inhuman or degrading treatment—so 
that the evidence should never have been admitted at trial regardless of probative 
value). 
 74. Corfu Channel, (U.K. /Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 75. See id. at 35 (“Between independent States, respect for territorial 
sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations. The Court 
recognizes that the Albanian Government’s complete failure to carry out its duties 
after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating 
circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure 
respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that 
the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.”). 
 76. See id. at 13–15 (establishing that the location of the mine sweeping of two 
ships happened in Albania’s territorial waters based on evidence presented by the 
United Kingdom). 
  
464 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
accept evidence that had been gathered in what was, according to the 
court in the same opinion, a violation of international law, it is 
difficult to see how the exclusionary rule of the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” applies under international law.77 
A final observation is that, in all of the cases discussed above, 
when the violation was considered to be sufficient to trigger an 
exclusionary rule, the violation was a violation of law in the legal 
system within which the tribunal is operating and assessing the 
evidence obtained. The evidentiary rule at the ICC goes so far as to 
make this limitation clear: a violation of state law will not be 
determinative of whether evidence is admitted before the ICC unless 
that violation is also a violation of international law.78 Therefore, 
even if we concluded that the fruit of the poisonous tree applied 
under international law, it would only prohibit evidence obtained 
through a violation of international law. 
In sum, the mandatory exclusionary rule for evidence gathered 
unlawfully does not appear to exist under international law. If it does 
exist under international law at all, it appears to operate only for the 
benefit of natural persons, not states, and can only be invoked where 
the evidence was gathered in violation of international law, not 
municipal law. Finally, in those few cases where the rule would 
apply, the violation would not result in an automatic exclusion of 
evidence. Instead, the evidence would only be excluded where it was 
gathered in a manner that renders it substantially unreliable and 
reliance on the evidence would cast serious doubt on the integrity of 
the proceedings.79  
In the case of leaked information, none of these concerns apply. It 
is debatable whether the leaking of information is a violation of 
domestic law, but it is certainly not a violation of international law. It 
could be that the fact that the evidence was leaked might affect its 
reliability; however, so far we have not heard authorities denying the 
authenticity of the leaked information, just attacking the lawfulness 
 
 77.  See id. at 35 (“To ensure respect for international law, of which it is the 
organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a 
violation of Albanian sovereignty.”). 
 78. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 35, art. 
69(7). 
 79. Id. 
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or morality of the leak.80 Lastly, the leaked information in this 
argument would be admitted to prove the existence of law, not fact. 
Clearly this distinction is not the easiest to maintain where the 
existence of the law could be a fact, and the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) discussion of the sources of evidence of 
customary international law does not appear to make any 
distinction.81 However, even if we would somehow find any of the 
foregoing concerns reason to doubt the admissibility of evidence, we 
must still pause to consider whether admissibility of evidence is ever 
a concern for the proof of law, not fact.  
That being said, there are two caveats for the use of leaked 
information that might be especially important for leaked 
information and international law. The first is that documents of 
evidence (not proof) should be assessed as such. Internal memoranda 
and diplomatic correspondence and cables to the foreign ministries 
might be showing internal disagreements and discussions, often 
separated from context.82 The second concern is that leaked 
information might be purposefully leaked as a part of a campaign of 
 
 80. Cf. Key Reaction to Wikileaks Cables Revelations, BBC (Nov. 29, 2010), 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11866220 (documenting the reaction to 
WikiLeaks of world leaders, who condemned the information leaks as hazardous to 
foreign policy interests); Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks 
Founders, but Legal Scholars Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2010), 
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/02legal.html?_r=1 (reporting that the U.S. 
Department of Justice was contemplating pursuing legal action against Assange). 
 81. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 5th Sess., June 5–July 29, 1950, Ways 
and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More 
Readily Available, at 4, ¶¶ 33–89, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (SUPP) (1950) (discussing 
texts of treaties and conventions, decisions of international courts and tribunals, 
decisions of national courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, 
opinions on questions of international law given by legal advisers to governments, 
and the practice of international organizations); see also Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interloc. Dec. on the Appl. Law, ¶ 87 (App. 
Chambers, Feb. 16, 2011) (finding that the existence of customary international 
law had been shown “beyond any shadow of doubt” without, however, 
determining that that is the applicable burden of proof). 
 82. See, e.g., Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 8, at 41 (holding that statements 
by officials, especially when unfavorable, should be treated with “caution”); Ways 
and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More 
Readily Available, supra note 81, at 8, ¶¶ 75–76 (urging caution when relying on 
“State papers,” as the contents may be deceiving because “arguments are often 
contentiously put forth which by no means represent the eventual view of the 
government”). 
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disinformation.83 If those concerns, among others, were taken into 
consideration in researching the law, and the actor assessing the law 
made the assessment objectively and responsibly, then it is difficult 
to see how the law thus found should be open to challenge. 
b. Ordinary Meaning, Context, and Object and Purpose 
Having concluded that leaked documents might contain treaty 
obligations themselves, the next inquiry under the law of treaties is 
the degree to which information in leaked documents might inform 
our understanding of other treaty obligations. This section will first 
look at the special meaning and then general meaning of treaty terms. 
Article 31(4) of the VCLT provides that: “A special meaning shall 
be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” It 
has not been established what sources are permissible for a special 
meaning. The commentary to the VCLT suggests that a special 
meaning could be established by context, with the debate focusing 
instead on the party bearing the burden of proof for establishing a 
special meaning.84 Surely leaked information might inform us of a 
special meaning. 
However, where a term does not have a special meaning, Article 
31(1) of the VCLT commands that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.” 
While the term “ordinary meaning” might appear at first glance to 
be clear, it dissolves on greater scrutiny. Delegates to the Conference 
on the Law of Treaties noted as much.85 The VCLT commentary 
 
 83. For example, the Uribe administration in 2008 was alleged to have 
carefully planned the leaking of information from computers of killed FARC 
commander Raul Reyes to link Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and 
Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa to the rebel group. 
 84. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries, II Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N. 187, art. 31 (1966), U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (ex-27), commentary (17) [hereinafter VCLT 
Commentaries] (describing how some parties wanted to put the burden of proving 
the special meaning of a term on the party who wanted to use that special 
meaning); VCLT Conference Recs., supra note 16, at 33d Mtg, ¶ 14 (as per 
Zemanek). 
 85.  See VCLT Conference Recs., supra note 16, at 32d Mtg, ¶ 8 (as per 
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argues that the ordinary meaning is the meaning in context and with 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, partly derived from the 
treaty preamble.86 Therefore, the ordinary meaning cannot be 
divorced from the object and purpose and context.87 Here, as well, 
leaked information could shed light on the object and purpose of the 
treaty, perhaps even guiding us on the “ordinary meaning.” 
Continuing with Article 31 of the VCLT, paragraph (2) instructs: 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
Although using the expression “treaty” in this provision, the 
VCLT also embraces the expressions “agreement” and “instrument,” 
suggesting that these are something other than treaties. Given that the 
VCLT was specifically about “treaties” and contained a definition of 
the term, we can guess that the term has particular significance, so 
where the drafters of the Vienna Convention used different terms, the 
usage must be meaningful.88 The terms “agreement” and 
“instrument,” suggest a broader scope of communications that may 
be considered in establishing the context of the treaty. Once again, 
leaked information might prove to be relevant. 
The important point for this provision is that context is not only to 
be considered when there is ambiguity, but rather that context is part 
of determining the ordinary meaning of the words.89 The ILC stated 
 
Krispis) (noting that, because one word usually has multiple meanings, the Greek 
representatives did not think it possible to rely on a word’s ordinary meaning). 
 86. VCLT Commentaries, supra note 84, art. 31 (ex-27), commentary (12). 
 87. See VCLT Conference Recs., supra note 16, at 33d Mtg., ¶ 7 (relaying that 
the ordinary meaning of a word is derived from its usage and context throughout 
the entire treaty). 
 88. See VCLT Conference Recs., supra note 16, at 33d Mtg. ¶ 30 (indicating 
that interpretation of a treaty should depend exclusively on documents written in 
relation to the treaty’s construction and adoption). 
 89. VCLT Commentaries, supra note 84, art. 31 (ex-27), commentary (13). 
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that the preamble of a treaty is very clearly part of its context,90 but 
the real issue is whether other documents (and, if so, which 
documents) could also form part of the context.91 The commentary to 
the Vienna Convention reaffirms that Article 31(2)(a) identifies two 
types of documents that can form context.92 The commentary 
clarifies that the crucial factor for both (a) and (b) is partly that they 
are not unilateral statements,93 although unilateral statements could 
form context where their “relation to the treaty was accepted in the 
same manner by the other parties.”94 
c. Subsequent Practice 
Lastly, communications can influence the interpretation of treaty 
terms where the communications are subsequent agreements 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty itself. Article 31(3) of the 
VCLT states: “There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions . . . .” The ILC identified as a question of fact whether an 
understanding during negotiations was meant to be an agreement for 
interpreting a treaty term, though it did not find it controversial that 
an understanding agreed prior to, contemporary with, or following 
the conclusion of a treaty could be considered an integral part of the 
treaty.95 If a leaked document could be considered a subsequent 
agreement, then it could fall under this rule. 
However, in addition to subsequent agreements, Article 31(3)(b) 
of the Vienna Convention also provides that subsequent practice can 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. See also VCLT Conference Recs., supra note 16 (as per Samad). 
 92. VCLT Commentaries, supra note 84, art. 31 (ex-27), commentary (14) 
(recounting that the two types of documents that can show context are “(a) any 
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty; and (b) any instrument which 
was made in connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. cmt. 14 (quoting Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.) Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 
28, 43, 75 (July 1)) (“[T]he provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an 
interpretation clause, and, as such should be regarded as an integral part of the 
Treaty . . . .”). 
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be considered.96 Discussions, understandings, and even memoranda 
of understanding might be communicated in secret documents that 
are later leaked. In the sections above, it has already been discussed 
whether a secret, leaked MOU could be considered a treaty (or other 
agreement), but even if it could not, it might still qualify as 
subsequent practice. In the Heathrow Airport User Charges 
arbitration, the United States and United Kingdom argued over 
whether an MOU, concluded after but in connection with a treaty, 
established legally binding obligations. The arbitration panel 
concluded that such an understanding at least constituted subsequent 
practice of the parties and thus informed the tribunal about the 
correct interpretation of the treaty.97 
Two instances in particular demonstrate the way that leaked 
information could serve as evidence of subsequent practice: the 
implementation of the double criminality rule in extradition and the 
practical application of the requirements of the Refugee Convention. 
Regarding the double criminality rule, the U.S. post in Bangkok has 
expressed concern that double criminality was being addressed by 
the court in the context of jurisdiction over the conduct, rather than 
prescription of the offense generally,98 and in the case of the Refugee 
 
 96. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31(3)(b) (noting that subsequent practice 
includes “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”). See also VCLT 
Commentaries, supra note 84, art. 31 (ex-27), commentary (15) (citing 
Competence of the I.L.O. Extending to International Regulation of the Conditions 
of Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion, 1922 P.C.I.J., (ser. B) No. 
2, 39 (Aug. 12)); Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier 
Between Turk. & Iraq), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 24 (Nov. 21); Payment in 
Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (Braz. v. Fr.), 1929 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 21, at 119 (July 12); Corfu Channel, (U.K. /Alb.), Judgment, 1949 
I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 97. Accord Husserl v. Swiss Air Trans. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (“[A] prime cannon of treaty construction is to look to the subsequent action 
of the parties for the interpretation of the treaty in areas clearly unanticipated at the 
time.”); see Heathrow Airport User Charges, Award on the First Question (U.S. v. 
U.K.), 34 R.I.A.A. 3, ¶ 6.7 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1992) (“In the judgment of the 
Tribunal, the MoU constitutes consensual subsequent practice of the Parties and, 
certainly as such, is available to the Tribunal as an aid to the interpretation of 
Bermuda 2 and, in particular, to clarify the meaning to be attributed to expressions 
used in the Treaty and to resolve any ambiguities.”). 
 98. See DOS Cable No. 09-BANGKOK-01998, ¶¶ 1, 3, 11 (Aug. 13, 2009) 
(“The disappointing August 11 Thai Lower Court ruling against the extradition of 
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Convention, the U.S. post in Moscow documented possible practice 
regarding resettlement coordination with the UNHCR.99 
d. Travaux Prépératoires 
Continuing with the examination of the Vienna Convention, the 
treaty provides that the rules obligatory on the parties can only be 
interpreted by reliance on supplementary means: 
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Once the threshold of ambiguity is reached, the interpreter can rely 
 
Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, and its dubious legal reasoning, requires a 
multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the appeals process. . . . 
His confusion of the “dual criminality” concept with jurisdictional issues similarly 
raises questions for efforts by Thailand to extradite fugitive former PM Thaksin to 
face justice. . . . Two key elements of his reasoning were: that the FARC in 
Colombia, to which Bout was conspiring to send weapons, was a political rather 
than a terrorist group; and that the “dual criminality” standard of our extradition 
treaty with Thailand had not been met since Bout could not be prosecuted in 
Thailand on the charges which the U.S. wants him to face in the U.S. In our view, 
the judge was wrong on both counts. Moreover, the judge’s misguided analysis of 
the “dual criminality” standard suggests that fugitives cannot be extradited from 
Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged crime, not 
whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of both 
countries.”). 
 99. See DOS Cable No. 07-MOSCOW-104, ¶¶ 1-3 (Jan. 12, 2007) (“[redacted] 
said that [redacted] had specifically asked [redacted] whether resettlement to the 
United States was an option. [redacted] responded to [redacted] that the chief 
concern was the safety of the asylum seekers and their rapid departure from 
Russia, which had made South Korea the best alternative in the past, according to 
[redacted]. We emphasized that the U.S. was willing to accept UNHCR referrals of 
North Koreans and that this should be presented as an option. [redacted] agreed to 
do so.”) (redactions in the original leaked version). 
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on supplementary means such as the travaux prépératoires.100 
Importantly, the VCLT does not define travaux prépératoires, and 
the ILC concluded that such omission was intentional.101 In fact, the 
ILC went so far as to acknowledge that it considered and rejected a 
rule that information must be published to qualify as travaux 
prépératoires.102 The delegates to the Vienna Conference also 
discussed the matter and did not act to amend the Convention to 
exclude secret communications.103 
Leaked information might also bear on the preparatory work of a 
treaty. Although information that is precisely on point is sparse, 
WikiLeaks has published U.S. Department of State cables revealing 
some of the incentives that were offered at the Cancun and 
Copenhagen conferences on climate change.104 
 
 100.  Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations 
(Art. 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J.. 57 (May 28); Interpretation 
of the Convention of 1919 Concerning the Employment of Women During the 
Night, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 50 (Nov. 15); VCLT 
Commentaries, supra note 84, art. 32 (ex-28), commentary (18) (citing 
Competency of the General Assembly for the Admission. of a State to the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3)). 
 101. See VCLT Commentaries, supra note 84, art. 32 (ex-28), commentary (20) 
(“The Commission did not think that anything would be gained by trying to define 
travaux prépératoires; indeed, to do so might only lead to the possible exclusion of 
relevant evidence.”). 
 102. See id. (suggesting that publication of travaux prépératoires was 
unnecessary because, for multilateral treaties, parties may ask to see these 
documents and, for bilateral treaties, parties will already be in possession of these 
documents even if they are unpublished). 
 103. See VCLT Conference Recs., supra note 16, 32d Mtg., ¶ 18  (as per Maliti) 
(claiming that because it is difficult to define what is included in the preparatory 
work of a treaty, “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion could only play a secondary part in interpretation”); VCLT Conference 
Recs., supra note 16, 33d Mtg. ¶ 8 (as per Sinclair) (summarizing the United 
Kingdom’s hesitancy toward utilizing preparatory works because such documents 
are “almost invariably confusing, unequal and partial . . .”). 
 104. See DOS Cable No. 10-STATE-18437, ¶ 6 (Feb. 26, 2010) (“Ghafoor 
[Maldives Ambassador-designate] added that Maldives would like to see that small 
countries, like Maldives, that are at the forefront of the climate debate, receive 
tangible assistance from the larger economies. Other nations would then come to 
realize that there are advantages to be gained by compliance . . . Ghafoor referred 
to several projects, including harbor deepening and strengthening sea walls, that 
are in the development stage. These projects would cost approximately $50 
million. Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to provide concrete examples and specific 
costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance and congressional 
  
472 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
C. BINDING UNILATERAL STATEMENTS 
Turning from treaties to other sources of international law, it 
seems best to discuss binding unilateral statements at this point 
before examining customary international law, since binding 
unilateral statements are often very similar to treaties in form and 
content. In the Einhorn case, the ECHR held that diplomatic 
assurances could amount to binding legal obligations where they 
qualify as treaties. In addition, the ECHR held that, in any event, the 
assurances, which were communicated in secret and relied upon by 
France, could amount to binding unilateral statements.105 The ECHR 
invoked the well-known holding of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests 
cases.106 This one case would be an example of how confidential 
 
appropriations.”); DOS Cable No. 10-BRUSSELS-186 ¶ 6 (Feb. 17, 2010) 
(“Hedegaard [European Commissioner for Climate Action] asked if the U.S. was 
prepared to move forward on Fast Start funding. She said some countries like 
Japan and the UK will press the inclusion of loan guarantees as part of the package 
and asked whether the U.S. will need to do any ‘creative accounting.’ She added: 
‘$30 billion had been promised — it cannot be lent.’ . . . On Fast Track financing, 
Pershing said the administration anticipated the need and budgeted funds in 2010 
and 2011. He said some U.S. funding would be directly applied for mitigation and 
adaptation and other sources would be indirect, citing for example program funds 
from various agencies and funds for food security. He concurred that it would be 
valuable to agree on what funds would be included in each country’s reporting, and 
said donors have to balance the political need to provide real financing with the 
practical constraints of tight budgets. He suggested that the small group of key 
donors—those that provide about 90% of the financing—convene quickly to 
discuss this issue.”). The day after the aforementioned cable, Timor-Leste 
announced its intention to associate itself with the Copenhagen Accord and noted 
that it had engaged in discussions with the Maldives about its leadership on the 
issue. See DOS Cable No. 10-DILI-38, ¶ 2 (Feb. 18, 2010) (“President Ramos-
Horta has made climate change a national priority and is personally engaged in 
diplomatic efforts to encourage other Asia-Pacific countries to group together and 
take a leadership role in the global negotiations. To that end, he made an official 
visit to the Maldives this week . . . where the agenda is expected to include 
discussions about climate change.”). See also DOS Cable No. 10-BEIJING-349 
(Feb. 10, 2010) (discussing the give-and-take of proposals and considerations 
between the United States and China at the Conference of Parties of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species). 
 105. See Einhorn v. France, App. No. 71555/01, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) 
(maintaining that, if the diplomatic notes constituted unilateral agreements, the 
United States is obliged to honor its commitments). 
 106. See id. (citing Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20)); see 
also Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 
53, at 68–69 (Apr. 5) (regarding the “Ihlen Declaration,” which Norway accepted 
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communications could form the basis for legal obligations. 
D. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Customary international law is the second source of law 
mentioned in the ICJ Statute. The Statute of the International Court 
of Justice describes legal custom as “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”107 The process by which customary international 
law is formed is well known, and it is widely accepted that this 
process produces a source of public international law.108 It entails 
 
as binding upon itself, thereby acknowledging Danish control of Greenland). In 
addition, the ICJ has held that unilateral statements accepting the jurisdiction of the 
court are also binding. Although not precisely on point, the comparison is 
informative of the perspective of the ICJ. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Jerusalem 
Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5, at 37 (Mar. 26) 
(holding that a renunciation of the right to seize the petitioner was a legally binding 
statement); Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), 1928 P.C.I.J., 
(ser. A) No. 12, at 23–24 (Apr. 26) (finding jurisdiction based on a statement by 
the respondent “in the course of the proceedings agreeing that the Court should 
decide a point which, in the Court’s opinion, would not otherwise have come 
within its jurisdiction”); German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 7, at 13 (May 25) (affirming that a statement by the respondent 
promising not to requisition property was legally binding); Free Zones of Upper 
Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 169–70 (June 7) 
(ordering a declaration made by Switzerland to be binding regardless of whether 
France agreed to the terms). 
 107. See Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 6, art. 38(b). 
 108. See e.g., ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 56–66 (1971) (discussing that “evidence of a 
psychological element independent of the material element” is arguably not 
required to prove the existence of opinio juris); Final Report of the Committee on 
the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles 
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 69 INT’L L. 
ASS’N REP. CONF. 713, 719–20 (2000) [hereinafter ILA REPORT] (concluding that 
if enough states engage in regular behavior that behavior will develop into a 
customary international law); H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 368–93 (1958) (analyzing 
the “psychological conception” of opinio juris in detail); Maurice H. Mendelson, 
The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 ACADEMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 155–59 (Recueil des Cours, 1999); Luigi Condorelli, Custom, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 206 (M. Bedjaoui ed., 
1991) (arguing that a State that relies on a regional or local custom must first prove 
the existence of such a custom); Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State 
Practice in a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 533–34 (R. St. 
J. Macdonald & D. Johnston eds., 1983) (positing that the legal framework of 
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two elements: (1) state practice, the objective or material element, 
and (2) opinio juris, the subjective or psychological element.109  
The particular items that can serve as evidence for the formation 
of customary international law form a laundry list. As per the ILC, 
such a list includes texts of international instruments, decisions of 
international courts, decisions of national courts, national legislation, 
diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national legal advisers, and 
practice of international organizations.110 In addition to ILC’s 
possible evidentiary sources, Brownlie offers a partly overlapping 
and partly supplementary statement of evidence of customary 
international law, including diplomatic correspondence, policy 
statements, press releases, opinions of legal advisers, official 
manuals on legal questions, comments by governments on drafts by 
the ILC, state legislation, international and national judicial 
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, 
pattern of treaties in the same form, practice of international organs, 
 
customary law is unlike the law of treaties, which is “relatively well known”). 
 109. See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 8, at 108 (“[B]efore reaching a 
conclusion on the nature of prohibited intervention, the Court must be satisfied that 
State practice justifies it.”); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 
1982 I.C.J. 18, 42 (Feb. 24) (inferring that a customary law could develop in a 
short time if adherence to a practice included “specially affected” states); Right of 
Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 44 (Apr. 12) (“Where 
therefore the Court finds a practice clearly established between two States which 
was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between them, the Court 
must attribute decisive effect to that practice for the purpose of determining their 
specific rights and obligations.”); Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 
(Nov. 20) (requiring Colombia to prove the “constant and uniform usage” of the 
State practice that they wish to invoke as customary international law); S.S. 
“Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 27–28 (1928) (declining to 
find a State practice of accepting jurisdiction in collision cases in the State “whose 
flag is flown” on the ship); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (6th ed. 
2008) (explaining that psychological elements require a State to act in accordance 
with State practice because it believes it is legally obligated to do so); IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–11 (5th ed. 1998) 
(outlining the elements of customary international law, including duration, 
consistency of practice, generality of practice, and acting in accordance with a 
perceived legal obligation). 
 110. See generally Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary 
International Law More Readily Available, supra note 81 (discussing all the types 
of documents that can serve as evidence for the formation of customary 
international law). 
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and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UNGA.111 The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) also identified 
the types of documents it would examine in seeking to discern the 
rules of customary international humanitarian law, with considerable 
overlap with the above. In particular, the ICRC examined statements 
made in the context of international organizations, national 
legislation, parliamentary debates, and military operational 
manuals.112 
Of these various sources of evidence, the ones relevant for leaked 
information—i.e., the ones likely to have been confidential—are 
diplomatic correspondence, the opinions of national legal advisers, 
and official manuals on legal questions. In light of the official 
manual Rules of Engagement in Iraq, which was posted on 
WikiLeaks, the last source is particularly significant.113 
One way in which leaked information might have bearing on the 
rules is the identification of specially affected states. When assessing 
state practice and opinio juris, scholars and courts will usually 
decline to examine every state in the world and will instead identify 
certain representative states, “specially affected states,” as a 
shorthand way to find relevant evidence.114 Leaked information 
 
 111. BROWNLIE, supra note 109, at 6. 
 112. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL. I: RULES xxiv, xl (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck, eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY] 
(confirming that such documents establish the existence of a State practice that 
“riot-control agents must not be used in hostilities”). For an example of the 
application of these sources, see id. at 264, Rule 75; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 
1995) (concluding that to demonstrate a customary rule a State must produce 
evidence, such as a military operational manual, because it is otherwise 
implausible “to pinpoint the actual behavior of the troops in the field for the 
purpose of establishing they in fact comply with, or disregard, certain standards of 
behavior”). 
 113. US Rules of Engagement for Iraq, WIKILEAKS, Apr. 5, 2010, 
http://file.wikileaks.org/file/rules of engagement.pdf. 
 114. See Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 70, ¶ 93–95; North Sea Continental 
Shelf (Germ./Den.; Germ./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.. 3, 227 (Feb. 20) (“Again, it is 
noteworthy that while 39 States are parties, initial steps towards the acceptance of 
the Convention have been taken by 46 States, who have signed it: half of them 
have ratified it . . . This mathematical computation, important as it is in itself, 
should be supplemented by, so to speak, a spectral analysis of the representativity 
of the States parties to the Convention.”); Corfu Channel, (U.K. /Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 
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might provide context for the acts of states and perhaps justify 
identification of certain states as specially affected. 
However some of this information might be originally secret. We 
have already dismissed questions of ex turpi and fruit of the 
poisonous tree arguments, so we need only examine whether there is 
any rule of international law that would prohibit secretly made 
statements that were subsequently leaked from being considered in 
the assessment of state practice and opinio juris. 
In its study of customary international law, the International Law 
Association concluded that practice must be public to qualify as such 
for purposes of the formation of customary international law.115 The 
ICRC echoed this conclusion and cited to the ILA.116 Tullio Treves 
writing in the Max Planck Encyclopedia argues similarly.117 
Unfortunately, the ILA and others do not cite to any authority for 
 
4 (Apr. 9); S.S. “Wimbledon” (U.K./Japan), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 
(Aug. 17) (relying on the Suez and Panama Canal Treaties alone to demonstrate a 
custom of the neutrality of international canals); Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interloc. Dec. on the Appl. Law, ¶ 87 (App. Chambers, 
Feb., 16, 2011) (“[T]he distillation of a shared norm does not require a 
comprehensive survey of all legal systems of the world.”) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Erdemović, Case No. IT96-22-A, Judgment, ¶ 91 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 1997) (McDonald & Vohrah, Js.) (“It is generally accepted that [a] 
comprehensive survey of all legal systems of the world [is not required] as this 
would involve a practical impossibility and has never been the practice of the 
International Court of Justice or other international tribunals which have had 
recourse to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.” Note, however, that the ICTY was 
discussing general principles of law, not customary international law.)); ILA 
REPORT, supra note 108, Principle 14, commentary (e); ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL 
STUDY, supra note 112, at xliv (“One reason why it is impossible to put a precise 
figure on the extent of participation required is that the criterion is in a sense 
qualitative rather than quantitative. That is to say, it is not simply a question of 
how many States participate in the practice, but also which States.”). 
 115. See ILA REPORT, supra note 108, Principle 5 (setting forth that an act must 
either be published or at least communicated to one other State to be considered 
public). 
 116. See ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 112, at xl (adding that 
actions cannot be public if other States do not have the chance to respond to the 
actions). 
 117.  See Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 79 (2006) available at 
http://www.mpepil.com/sample_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1393&recno=34& (explaining that “unpublished practice” is not helpful in 
shaping customary international law for the simple fact that the majority of States 
are not aware of its existence). 
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support of this conclusion other than the logic of customary 
international law, when we assume it is based on an “offer – 
acceptance” model. Of course, it is not entirely clear in international 
law that such an explanatory model necessarily has a normative 
effect on the formation of customary international law. As an 
example of evidence that would not qualify as evidencing customary 
international law, the ILA stated, “Internal memoranda are therefore 
not, as such, forms of State practice, and the confidential opinions of 
Government legal advisers, for instance, are not examples of the 
objective element in custom.”118 This example cannot be right. An 
internal memorandum is not practice, other than the practice of 
writing a memorandum. The memorandum can only document a 
practice or evidence an opinio juris. However, just because the 
practice or opinio juris is documented in an internal memorandum 
does not mean that it was not “public” in the sense used by the ILA. 
A highly visible, public act that was described in a confidential 
memorandum that was subsequently leaked should be admissible as 
evidence of the public practice. The ILA and ICRC reason that, to be 
a state practice for purposes of customary international law, other 
states must have an opportunity to react to the practice as lawful or 
unlawful.119 The ICJ has relied on internal memoranda for proof of 
facts.120 Therefore, the “public” aspect should be understood to be 
“public” in the sense that it need not “necessarily be communicated 
to all of the world, but that, if it is not publicized generally (e.g. by 
 
 118. ILA REPORT, supra note 108, Principle 5, commentary a. 
 119. Id. (“(a) . . . If the customary process is seen as one of claim and response, 
the reason is clear: an internal memorandum which is not communicated to others 
is not a claim or a response. (It is otherwise if the State publicizes the legal 
analysis in support of its position: it then becomes part of its claim.) If the 
memorandum is only afterwards made public (e.g. through the operation of laws 
opening national archives to the public after a certain period of time), it may be 
evidence of the State’s subjective attitude to the issue, but is not an instance of the 
‘objective element’. (b) By the same token, a secret physical act (e.g. secretly 
‘bugging’ diplomatic premises) is probably not an example of the objective 
element. And if the act is discovered, it probably does not count as State practice 
unless the State tries to assert that its conduct was legally justified.”); see also 
ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 112, at xl (“This is so as long as such 
acts are not known to other States and, consequently, do not give them an 
opportunity, if they so wished, to react to them. In order to count, practice has to be 
public or communicated to some extent.”). 
 120. See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 136 (relying on an internal memo, 
supplied by Nicaragua, to show that Nicaragua supplied arms to El Salvador). 
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legislation, press statements, etc.), it must be communicated to at 
least one other State.”121 The ICRC reasons similarly that the acts 
must be communicated, but it would also permit communication to 
the ICRC to count.122 There is no justifiable reason for distinguishing 
between information made public through official or inadvertent 
release and leaked, other than the usual concerns about reliability 
that would be applied to any evidentiary matter. Leaked information 
is often the report of information that has been communicated from 
state to state, or, where it was not communicated, states have had the 
opportunity to react after the leak. Therefore, leaked acts should 
qualify as public. In any event, once leaked, the information becomes 
public, and states have ample opportunity to complain.  
For similar reasons, secret or internal communications 
brainstorming about possible courses of action should not be 
inadmissible as evidence of opinio juris simply because they are, or 
were, confidential. Indeed, the fact that they were made in an internal 
context might diminish their evidentiary value, but their nature as 
secret should not render them inadmissible per se on the basis of not 
contributing to the formation of customary international law. In fact, 
the ICJ has ruled that an official, although originally secret, 
communication about an undertaking between executives would 
evidence the opinio juris regarding the obligation.123 
There does not seem to be a rule prohibiting leaked documents 
from being used for evidentiary purposes in proving a rule of 
customary international law, and, in fact, it appears that international 
law (or at least international actors) encourage their use. In the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ opined that statements by “high-ranking 
official political figures, sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of 
particular probative value when they acknowledge facts or conduct 
unfavourable to the State represented by the person who made 
 
 121. ILA REPORT, supra note 108, Principle 5, commentary (a); Treves, supra 
note 117, ¶ 79. 
 122. See ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 112, at xl (conveying that 
publication to the ICRC is adequate because “communications to the ICRC, while 
often confidential, are not purely private acts and count as State practice”). 
 123. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 27, ¶¶ 46–47 (affirming that the executive branch is the 
primary branch to formulate international obligations). 
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them.”124 This statement could be implicitly condoning the use of 
leaked information, since unfavorable admissions might be more 
likely in confidential communications. In addition, when the ILC 
examined the “Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of 
Customary International Law More Readily Available,” the 
Commission expressed a frustration that this kind of valuable 
information was not usually published.125 In discussing diplomatic 
correspondence, the ILC argued that limiting access to such 
correspondence was detrimental to the cause of discovering 
customary international law.126 In discussing the opinions of national 
legal advisers, the ILC similarly expressed concern at the lack of 
publication or dissemination of those materials.127 Even the very 
working title of “Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of 
Customary International Law More Readily Available” suggests that 
the ILC thought it was a legitimate goal to encourage increased 
access to helpful materials, although the ILC’s primary concern 
might have been inability to publicize rather than intent to maintain 
secrecy. 
There are a number of instances where leaked documents might be 
considered in the context above as evidence of state practice or 
opinio juris. Several leaked cables show that the leaders of Saudi 
Arabia,128 Abu Dhabi,129 and other Arab states130 urged the United 
 
 124. Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 8, at 41. 
 125. See Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International 
Law More Readily Available, supra note 81, at 368–72, ¶ 87 (advocating that to 
remedy this problem, States should publish digests, sponsored by the government, 
detailing their international practice). 
 126. See id. ¶ 71 (“The diplomatic correspondence between Governments must 
supply abundant evidence of customary international law. For various reasons, 
however, much of the correspondence is not published. Within the limits set by 
propriety, some Governments publish selected texts of diplomatic exchanges, but 
frequently only after a lapse of years. Archives of foreign offices are in some cases 
opened to access by qualified scholars engaged in research, but usually only up to 
a particular time.”). 
 127. See id. ¶ 76 (“The opinions on questions of international law given by legal 
advisers to Governments are published in few countries.”). 
 128. See DOS Cable No. 10-RIYADH-184, supra note 29, ¶ 10 (“Al-Jubeir 
recalled the King’s frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end 
to its nuclear weapons program. ‘He told you to cut off the head of the snake,’ he 
recalled to the Chargé, adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian 
influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.”). 
 129. See DOS Cable No. 07-ABU DHABI-187 (Feb. 7, 2007) (discussing the 
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States to attack Iran. The officials were clearly aware of international 
law generally—the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia and one of the 
princes did mention it131—but they did not mention that such an 
action might be unlawful. The cables also substantiate the claims that 
the United States has used force in Yemen, potentially unlawfully.132 
Both of these cases might show an evolution in customary 
international law on the use of force. In addition to the use-of-force 
cases, the leaked cables have also shown that the U.S. Secretary of 
State routinely ordered U.S. officials to collect “intelligence” on 
U.N. officials, including orders to collect credit card information, 
passwords, and frequent-flyer account numbers. These included U.N. 
officials as high-ranked as the U.N. Secretary General, who is 
supposed to be inviolable.133 One report discusses the Argentine 
practice regarding the law of the sea as of 1966, being six-mile 
territorial waters, six-mile exclusive fishing, and 200-mile extended 
preferential jurisdiction.134 Other cables have reported on offers for 
transfer of Guantanamo detainees to Slovenia and Belgium, 
apparently in exchange for increased diplomatic access and 
prominence in Europe,135 and a warning by the United States to 
 
growing threat of Iran and positing that Iran’s nuclear program must be stopped). 
 130. But see DOS Cable No. 07-DUBAI-355 (June 3, 2007) (reporting that 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maftoum of Dubai, when meeting with Joseph 
Lieberman, urged the United States not to use force against Iran). 
 131. See DOS Cable No. 10-RIYADH-184, supra note 29, ¶ 11 (discussing the 
possibility that tougher sanctions against Iran could be implemented without prior 
U.N. approval). 
 132. See DOS Cable No. 09-SANAA-2251, ¶ 5 (Dec. 21, 2009) (“Given that 
local and international media will continue to look for evidence of a U.S. role in 
the December 17 strikes against AQAP [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], the 
ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] must think seriously about its public 
posture and whether its strict adherence to assertions that the strikes were unilateral 
will undermine public support for legitimate and urgently needed CT operations, 
should evidence to the contrary surface. Thus far, the ROYG has deployed 
influential local leaders to the affected area in Abyan to explain the need for the 
strikes in an effort to quell potential unrest; however, it has not attempted to 
provide any context for the civilian casualties, which might help to counter 
overblown claims of ROYG disregard for the local population ) [sic] in this 
particular case, southerners.”). See also DOS Cable No. 10-RIYADH-184, supra 
note 29, ¶ 4 (expressing Saudi support for U.S. strikes in Yemen). 
 133. See DOS Cable No. 09-STATE-80163 (July 31, 2009) (discussing the 
“HUMINT” directive). 
 134. See DOS Cable No. 66-BUENOS AIRES-2481 (Dec. 28, 1966). 
 135. See DOS Cable No. 09-BRUSSELS-1580, ¶ 5 (Nov. 24, 2009) (“The 
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Germany not to prosecute CIA officers in a botched arrest operation. 
E. ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The degree to which international organizations can make law is 
controversial, but leaked documents might give us some insight into 
the effects of international organization acts in the internal policies 
and choices of governments. An example of this effect is the report 
on the Serbian government’s internal consideration of the orders 
from the ICTY.136 The way in which states receive, process, and 
 
Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in the 
closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium resettled one 
detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to Belgian officials. 
We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who have already been 
convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the ‘placement’ of detainees, but 
instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the Belgian Ministry of 
Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier for Belgian society to 
accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the possibility of 
Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the footlights on 
Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG’s — and Europe’s — problem with 
Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There 
are signs that Belgium’s reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership. Complaints 
about Belgium’s exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to perceived 
influence of a ‘directoire’ of large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter 
of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in a more assertive 
role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within Europe that permits it to be 
effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to take more 
than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination with others (as led by 
Belgium), so that Guantanamo — which Europeans always so roundly condemned 
— is closed once and for all.”). 
 136. See DOS Cable No. 06-BELGRADE-1681, ¶¶ 1-2 (Oct. 17, 2006) (“Carla 
del Ponte has sharply criticized the ineffectiveness of GoS [Government of Serbia] 
implementation of the ‘Action Plan’ Serbia negotiated this summer with ICTY and 
has told us that the PM has demonstrated no political will to take the steps 
necessary to bring about Mladic’s arrest. By contrast, the PM declared over the 
weekend that Serbia has done ‘absolutely everything’ to cooperate with ICTY and 
criticized the EU’s ‘irrational’ approach on Hague conditionality.”); see also DOS 
Cable No. 09-BELGRADE-399, ¶ 1 (May 6, 2009) (“The Serbian government 
continues to publicly emphasize its efforts to capture war crimes indictee Ratko 
Mladic, and Serbian officials responsible for cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) privately tell us the current 
government is very supportive of their work. ICTY Belgrade’s chief, who sits in 
on operations discussions, agreed that Serbia was looking hard for Mladic and was 
also providing all document and witness assistance required, in contrast to the 
previous government’s efforts. Serbia also continued to prosecute domestic war 
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consider the acts of international organizations in the formation of 
their policy choices evidences an opinio juris regarding the legal 
value of those acts, perhaps going so far as to amend the provisions 
on legal value contained in the constitutive instrument of the 
organization. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
We might also consider the effect of leaked documents on the 
legal personality of certain entities. This article is primarily 
concerned with the formation of law, not facts. However, the 
formation of law is often dependent on the establishment of facts, 
and the legal personality of an entity is usually considered to be a 
mixed question of law and fact.137 Furthermore, whether an entity is 
an international legal person has bearing on whether that entity can 
contribute to the formation of international law and is thus also 
important for law in that way. 
The Holy See and Kosovo are two entities with less than universal 
recognition of personality that have been the subject of discussion in 
leaked documents.138 Recently, Geoffrey Robertson has questioned 
the statehood, or international legal personality, of the Vatican and/or 
Holy See, and thus the derivative Head of State immunity of the 
Pope.139 Leaked documents may evidence a crack in the edifice of the 
personality of the Holy See/Vatican. In the midst of the sexual abuse 
scandals in Ireland, a nation that might be expected to be one of the 
 
crimes cases, and the war crimes court recently issued verdicts and sentences in 
two high-profile cases. The current government clearly wants to find Mladic, a 
prerequisite for moving ahead with EU accession and Serbia’s future.”). 
 137. Cf. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary 
International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 
156 (1995) (asserting that recognition is an important question in determining 
whether an entity has legal personality). 
 138. These are not the only examples. See, e.g., DOS Cable No. 10-
JERUSALEM-292 (Feb. 17, 2010) (discussing upcoming Palestinian municipal 
elections but using expressions like “national” elections, “PA [Palestinian 
Authority] President,” and Palestinian “law,” which could suggest an evolving 
position on Palestinian statehood); DOS Cable 10-AI TAIPEI-157 (Feb. 10, 2010) 
(examining Taiwan-P.R. China cross-straits trade discussions for similar 
occasional terminology, suggesting a less than absolute position on Taiwan). 
 139.  See generally GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE CASE OF THE POPE: VATICAN 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE (2010). 
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more adamant defenders of the personality of the Holy See, the 
Murphy Commission, a non-judicial organ, directly ordered the 
Papal Nuncio to testify and did not send such an order through 
diplomatic channels.140 The Nuncio responded that a foreign 
ambassador cannot be compelled to testify.141 The Irish government 
later intervened to halt the request, but the immunity flowing from 
international legal personality was not widely perceived or 
accepted.142 However, the recent closure of the Irish mission to the 
Holy See, the complaint to the ICC against the Pope and others, and 
the recent decision of the Queen’s Bench that priests of the Roman 
Catholic Church can be assimilated to employees of a corporation for 
vicarious liability purposes may evidence a waning of the perception 
of international legal personality in the Holy See and/or Vatican 
City.143 
 
 140.  Frances D’Emilio, Irish Angry at Vatican as Summit Ends, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8947353/print. 
 141.  Brian Lavery, Church to Pay $323,000 and Apologize in Irish Sex Abuse 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/10/world/ 
church-to-pay-323000-and-apologize-in-irish-sex-abuse-case.html. 
 142. See DOS Cable No. 10-VATICAN-33, ¶ 5 (Feb. 26, 2010) (“The Irish 
government wanted to be seen as cooperating with the investigation because its 
Education Department was implicated, but did not want to insist that the Vatican 
answer the requests because they had come outside of regular channels. In the end, 
the Irish government decided not to press the Vatican to reply, according to 
Fahey’s Deputy, Helena Keleher. Moreover, Keleher told Polchief the CDF 
[Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith] probably did not have much to add to 
the inquiry. Regarding the request for the Nuncio to testify, Keleher said the GOI 
[Government of Ireland] understood that foreign ambassadors are not required or 
expected to appear before national commissions. Nevertheless, Keleher thought the 
Nuncio in Ireland made things worse by simply ignoring the requests.”). But see 
DOS Cable No. 01-VATICAN-3507 (July 3, 2001) (maintaining confidentially the 
United States’ position that the Vatican enjoys international legal personality, 
although that is not necessarily the same thing as statehood). 
 143. See J.G.E. v. English Province of Our Lady of Charity, [2011] EWHC 
(Q.B.) 2871 (Eng.) (MacDuff, J.); Philip Pullella, Vatican Stunned by Irish 
Embassy Closure, REUTERS, Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
11/04/us-vatican-ireland-idUSTRE7A33D120111104 (observing that Ireland 
explained the decision to close its embassy as a financial austerity measure to meet 
EU-IMF bailout expenditure requirements); CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
Victims’ Communication Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute Requesting 
Investigation and Prosecution of High-level Vatican Officials for Rape and Other 
Forms of Sexual Violence as Crimes Against Humanity and Torture as a Crime 
Against Humanity, ICC File No. OTP-CR-159/11 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/243877/victims-communication.pdf. 
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Kosovo is a second case. Kosovo is not universally regarded as a 
state,144 and the leadership of Serbia has been publically adamantly 
opposed to it operating as or becoming an independent state. This 
opposition by Serbia in turn might be a cause for Russian opposition, 
and hence a potential veto for U.N. membership. Leaked cables 
report a slightly different story. In one of the cables, Ambassador 
Mary Warlick reported about her February 3, 2010, conversation 
with President Boris Tadić’s foreign policy adviser Jovan Ratkovic. 
Ambassador Warlick wrote that Ratkovic “detailed his plans to 
discuss possible ways forward on Kosovo,” that would include 
“discreet brainstorming” with U.S. State Department officials and 
members of Congress, saying that Serbia sought a “realistic, 
pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution for Serbs and Albanians.” This 
brainstorm included a variety of scenarios:  
Kosovo; Option B: Partition; Option C: Serbia chooses between Kosovo 
or the EU. Option A (i.e., finding a way to define Serbia’s special 
interests in the north and with the status of some churches in the south) 
most likely reflects the ideas that Belgrade is most interested in exploring. 
While Serbia’s lack of a commitment to recognize Kosovo will remain an 
EU stumbling in the long-term, Ratkovic’s overture next week may 
provide an initial first step toward defining a more realistic modus 
vivendi, which we have been encouraging the Serbs to explore.145  
 
 144. See International Recognition of Kosovo, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo (last visited Oct. 
9, 2012). Whether Wikipedia, as opposed to WikiLeaks, constitutes a reliable 
enough source for academic research purposes is an entirely different question. 
 145. DOS Cable No. 10-BELGRADE-25 (Feb. 5, 2010) ¶ 15; see also DOS 
Cable No. 06-BELGRADE-1681, supra note 136, ¶ 1 (“We expect Serbia will 
continue to obstruct and undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty in the lead up to and 
following the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, which most believe 
will be ambiguous. Regardless of the position taken by the ICJ, Kosovo’s 
independence and sovereignty are irrefutable. Serbia’s government is unified in its 
refusal to accept that fact but is internally divided regarding how to push its claim 
to Kosovo after the ICJ issues its opinion in spring 2010. President Boris Tadic and 
his office appear willing to follow our and the EU’s advice and to quietly accept 
any outcome while moving Serbia toward EU integration, but are lacking a 
coordinated plan to do so. In contrast, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, driven by 
personal interest in self promotion [sic] and a misperception of the domestic 
political landscape, is planning a new diplomatic offensive on Kosovo on the heels 
of any ICJ opinion. Absent an alternative approach by Tadic, we expect Jeremic’s 
more confrontational plan will win out. To temper Serbia’s post ICJ strategy and to 
limit its duration and impact, we will need to be well coordinated with our EU 
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This discussion suggests a far less entrenched opposition, as was 
apparently evidenced most recently in the new approach to 
permitting Kosovo international participation,146 which could mean 
that the real blend of law and fact tilts in favor of Kosovar statehood. 
IV. LEX FERENDA 
Lastly, this article would be remiss in failing to mention that 
leaked information can have a slightly different and additional 
impact on the rules of international law through lex ferenda. 
Knowledge of secret interactions, deals and practices can inspire and 
motivate change of the lex lata. Perhaps the rules on responsibility 
should be changed in light of the intense level of involvement certain 
corporations have been revealed to have in some governments.147 
This author will not go so far as others who might argue that public 
 
allies and encourage the EU to wisely use its significant remaining carrots and 
sticks with Serbia to elicit the cooperative resolution of this issue, while assuring 
Kosovo’s territorial integrity. We must also be prepared to fight Serbia in the 
UNGA if necessary.”); DOS Cable No. 09-PRISTINA-77, ¶ 7 (Feb. 23, 2009) (“If 
Kosovo is to succeed as a long-term proposition — and it most certainly can — 
our sustained engagement is necessary to bolster European resolve, bring Belgrade 
to a more realistic sense of its equities in peace and stability, and take a firm line 
with the UN on further reducing its presence in Kosovo. These meetings in 
Washington will help reinforce the sense that Kosovo is moving forward and 
imbue Kosovo’s leadership with a renewed sense of confidence as they prepare to 
face the many challenges ahead.”). 
 146. See Matthew Brunwasser, Kosovo and Serbia Reach Key Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/europe/25iht-
kosovo25.html?scp=2&sq=Kosovo&st=cse (explaining that, in exchange for 
allowing Kosovars to represent themselves in “international forums,” Kosovo’s 
name will not include the word “Republic”). 
 147. See DOS Cable No. 06-THE HAGUE-2654 (Dec. 21, 2006) (noting Dutch 
support of targeted sanctions against Iran as long as they do not harm Shell 
operations); DOS Cable No. 07-THE HAGUE-246 (July 9, 2007) (discussions 
between the US Ambassador, the Dutch Government, and Shell regarding its 
operations in Iran); DOS Cable No. 07-THE HAGUE-935 (May 16, 2007) 
(reporting that Shell regularly briefs the Dutch government on its activities in Iran; 
also stating that Shell has its employees in all Nigerian government ministries and 
knows “everything that was being done in those ministries”). See also DOS Cable 
No. 09-MADRID-71, ¶ 9 (Jan. 21, 2009) (describing the degree to which the U.S. 
government was involved in advocating for a Spanish Ministry of Defense contract 
bid by General Electric against a competing bid by Rolls-Royce, and the personal 
involvement of Zapatero in overruling the final award of the bid to Rolls-Royce in 
favor of GE because it was “important to the USG [U.S. government]”). 
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opinion in itself can change the rules; however, public opinion can 
motivate change in behavior by the actors and result in changes in 
the law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to suggest some possibilities for the 
impact that secret, but leaked, information could have on the rules of 
international law. To determine what the effect might be, we looked 
at the various sources of law enumerated in the ICJ Statute, as well 
as binding unilateral statements and the acts of international 
organizations.  
As threshold matters, ex turpi causa non oritur actio, the fruit of 
the poisonous tree, and similar principles were examined since the 
leaking and/or acquiring of leaked information might be criminal. Ex 
turpi and related principles were dismissed for a number of reasons: 
(1) there was no clear reliance on the wrong itself but rather the facts 
in a document that was not itself wrongful; (2) the actors that sought 
to rely on the information were not the ones committing the wrong; 
(3) the crime committed, if any, would be one of domestic law, not 
of international law; and (4) any wrong committed is not of sufficient 
gravity to counterbalance ex factis jus oritur. Fruit of the poisonous 
tree was also dismissed for the following reasons: (1) it is uncertain 
whether the rule even exists in international law in the context of 
state responsibility, not international individual criminal 
responsibility, and (2) even if the rule does exist in some way in 
international law, it was questioned whether exclusion is a remedy 
under international law in state-to-state relationships. 
This paper then proceeded to examine the law of treaties for two 
purposes. First it assessed the definition of a treaty, and second it 
assessed the evidentiary function in interpreting treaties. As for the 
first possibility, there did not appear to be any difficulty with a 
leaked document, even one conceived and adopted in secrecy, being 
a treaty itself. This analysis also necessitated a brief examination of 
the non-legally binding agreement and whether such an agreement 
could constitute a treaty notwithstanding its non-legally binding 
nature. Leaked information might shed light on the intended legal 
effects of these kinds of documents. Turning to the second possibility 
under the law of treaties, we examined the ways in which leaked 
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information might serve an evidentiary function in interpreting 
treaties, by giving us insight into the ordinary meaning, context, and 
object and purpose of a treaty; documenting travaux prépératoires; 
or evidencing subsequent agreement or practice between the parties.  
This paper also considered the ways in which leaked information 
might contribute to the formation of customary international law, 
primarily the ways in which leaked information might evidence 
practice and opinio juris. Several important evidentiary roles were 
identified, most importantly documenting the practice and opinio 
juris themselves, but also, for example, assisting in identifying 
specially interested or specially affected states. Although some 
authorities have objected to the use of secret documents as evidence 
of custom, this author concluded that it is not the secret nature of the 
documenting of practice that is problematic, but rather the secret 
nature of the practice itself. Thus, the form and manner of 
documenting practice does not affect its evidentiary value. In any 
event, once a secret document is leaked, it ceases to be secret and the 
question is moot. 
Lastly, the author also considered the potential for leaked 
information to contain binding unilateral statements and the role that 
leaked information might play in the law-making function of 
international organizations. 
Having concluded on the sources of law, this paper took a brief 
detour to examine the ways in which leaked information might affect 
the international legal personality some entities enjoy. Generally, this 
question is regarded as a mixed one of fact and law. Leaked 
information might have a bearing on both the law to be applied and 
the facts to be established. In particular, the Holy See and Kosovo 
were discussed in leaks. 
Although WikiLeaks and the phenomena that it represents have 
raised many questions in the law, to date we have not been 
discussing the question of the effect that leaked information might 
have on the law. To a large degree, leaked information does not have 
a significant impact beyond functioning within the normal doctrine 
on the sources of law. We appear to be moving into an era of 
increased access and transparency, and inability to prevent the viral 
spread of leaked information. Law, and international law in 
particular, must take cognizance of this change and absorb it. It is 
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possible through the normal rules for now, although the growth in 
leaked information might have a greater effect in the future. It might 
even inspire changes in some of the more fundamental notions that 
underpin the law. 
 
